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Abstract
This paper investigates the equilibrium relationship between wages and prices across labor
markets. Of central interest is the extent to which workers receive higher wages to compensate
for differences in the cost of living. According to the spatial equilibrium hypothesis, the utility
of homogenous workers should be equal across labor markets. This implies that controlling for
amenity differences across areas, the elasticity between wages and the general price level across
areas should equal one, at least under certain conditions. I test this hypothesis and find that the
predicted relationship holds when housing prices are measured by rents and the general price
level is instrumented to account for measurement error. When housing prices are measured by
housing values, however, the wage-price elasticity is significantly less than one, even using
instrumental variables. Rents reflect the price paid for housing per unit of time and are arguably
the superior measure. Thus, findings in this essay provide support for the full compensation
hypothesis. These findings also have important implications for researchers estimating the
implicit prices of amenities or ranking the quality of life across areas.
JEL Classification: R23, R20, J31
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1. Introduction
A number of studies have shown that wages differ across labor markets even after control
for observable individual characteristics.1 Such wage dispersion across markets can in part be
attributed to differences in prices and amenities across areas. If a city has higher prices for goods
and services providing a given level of utility, workers will require higher wages to work there.2
Similarly, if a city has nicer amenities, all else the same, workers will be willing to accept lower
wages to work there. In order for a spatial equilibrium to occur, utility must be equal across
areas for workers with identical skills and preferences. In previous literature, this is sometimes
referred to as the competitive hypothesis or the law of one wage. Many studies have attempted
to test the competitive hypothesis (e.g. regional wage gap studies), but they are often hindered by
limited information on area prices and amenities.
Several studies interested in interarea wage differentials have used an interarea price
index to fully adjust wages for price differences by dividing nominal wages by the price index.3
Other studies have used fully adjusted wages to measure the implicit prices of amenities across
cities (e.g. Rosen, 1979; Greenwood et al., 1991; and Glaeser and Tobio, 2008).4 DuMond et al.
(1999), however, suggest that full adjustment for prices may be inappropriate to measure
interarea wage differentials. They instead advocate using a partial adjustment whereby the log of
the price index (and potentially higher order terms) is included as an independent variable in a
log wage equation. The coefficient on the log of the price index can be interpreted as the wageprice elasticity. One hypothesis is that the elasticity between wages and the general price level is

1

See Dickie and Gerking (1989) for an early review of the literature on interarea wage differentials in the United
States.
2
In this paper, I often use the term city to refer to metropolitan areas.
3
See for example, Coelho and Ghali (1971, 1973), Bellante (1979), Gerking and Weirick (1983), Johnson (1983),
Sahling and Smith (1983), Dickie and Gerking (1987), and Farber and Newman (1987).
4
See Gyourko et al. (1999) for a review of the literature on amenity valuation and quality of life.
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equal to one.5 I refer to this as the full compensation hypothesis. Researchers who fully adjust
wages for prices implicitly assume that the full compensation hypothesis holds, but few studies
have explicitly tested the full compensation hypothesis.
Two studies that have estimated the elasticity between wages and prices are Roback
(1988) and DuMond et al. (1999). Roback (1988) uses a now discontinued cost of living index
produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and estimates a wage-price elasticity of 0.97, both
with and without controls for amenities, which would seem to lend support for the full
compensation hypothesis. As discussed below, a reexamination of Roback (1988), however,
suggests that her measurement of prices is inappropriate and biases her estimates. DuMond et
al. (1999) use a price index based on the ACCRA Cost of Living Index and find a wage-price
elasticity of 0.46 controlling for amenities and 0.37 absent amenities. Thus, the magnitude of the
wage-price elasticity and validity of the full compensation hypothesis are still open questions.
This paper builds on earlier work by examining the equilibrium relationship between
wages and prices, controlling for amenities. I stress the word equilibrium because wages and
prices are simultaneously determined. While this paper does not provide evidence on the causal
effect of prices on wages or vice versa, much can be learned from examining the equilibrium
relationship between the two. Following Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982), I develop a model
that predicts that under certain conditions (e.g. Cobb-Douglas utility) the elasticity between
wages and the general price level should equal one controlling for amenities. In other words,
workers should be fully compensated for differences in prices across cities. However, to the
extent that the assumptions of the model do not hold, the elasticity between wages and the

5

Throughout this paper, I often refer to the “general price level” in a city. I mean by this a composite price index
based on a fixed basket of housing and non-housing goods weighted by the consumption shares of the relative
goods.
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general price level may differ from unity. The relationship between wages and prices is
ultimately an empirical question.
I find that estimates of the wage-price elasticity are sensitive to whether housing prices
are measured by housing values or rental payments. Rents are the ideal measure of housing
prices, the price paid per unit of time for the use of housing, but in practice housing values are
often used to measure housing prices. My preferred specification measures housing prices by
rents. Measuring housing prices by rents and using Ordinary Least Squares, I estimate the wageprice elasticity to equal 0.76, but OLS estimates may be downwardly biased due to measurement
error in the price index, especially the non-housing price component. Instrumenting for the rentbased price index using rents for the previous year, the estimated elasticity between wages and
the general price level is nearly identical to one. Again, if rents are the ideal measure of housing
prices, this finding provides strong empirical support for the full compensation hypothesis.
When housing prices are measured by housing values, the estimated elasticity between
wages and the general price level is never more than 0.5, even using instrumental variables. The
findings of this paper have important implications for researchers estimating the implicit prices
of amenities or ranking the quality of life across areas. First, when adjusting wages for prices,
housing prices should be measured by rents and not values. Second, it is shown that ignoring
differences in non-housing prices, as often done, biases estimates of the implicit prices of
amenities.

2. Theoretical Considerations
This section develops a simple model of the equilibrium relationship between wages,
prices, and amenities across cities and regions following Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982).

3

Firms produce

and

according to constant returns to scale production functions using labor

( ), capital ( ), and land ( ) given locational differences in productivity due to amenities ( ):
, , ;

. The marginal products of labor, capital, and land are all non-negative, but

increases in amenities can either increase or decrease productivity. The price of capital is
determined exogenously in the world market and normalized to equal one, while the prices of
labor ( ) and land ( ) are determined competitively in local markets. In equilibrium, firms
earn zero profits and the price of each good is equal to its unit cost of production ( ):
,

(1)

;

,

= 1, 2.

Workers maximize utility subject to a budget constraint, where utility is a function of
goods

and

,

and location-specific amenities:

;

. Workers are mobile across

cities and regions, and in equilibrium utility for identical workers is equal across areas. The
indirect utility function can be represented as a function of wages and the prices of

and

given amenities:
,

(2)

,

;

.

Taking the total differential of both sides of (2), setting

= 0, rearranging, and employing

Roy’s Identity yields a slight variant of the equation used by Roback to estimate the implicit
price of amenities (Eq. 5 in Roback, 1982):
.6

(3)

However, instead of solving for the price of amenities (
Dividing both sides of (3) by
(4)

ln

/

), the equation is solved for

.

, converts the equation to logarithmic form:
ln

/

ln

6

/

.

Alternatively, we could have defined the expenditure function and used Shephard’s Lemma to obtain an equivalent
result as in Albouy (2008b).
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Equation (4) says that controlling for amenities, a one percent increase in the price of
will require wages to increase by a percentage equal to the share of wages spent on
for utility to remain constant. The same is true for increases in the price of

in order

, and the result

easily generalizes to the case of more than two goods. In other words, the wage-price elasticity
for a good should be equal to the budget share of the good, assuming that non-wage income is
negligible. Furthermore, if total consumption expenditure is equal to wage income,
, then a one percent increase in the prices of all goods will require wages to
increase by one percent to maintain equal utility.
While this interpretation of equation (4) is valid for small changes in prices, it may be
less valid for large changes in prices as consumers respond to large price differences by altering
their consumption mix. However, if utility is Cobb-Douglas as suggested by Davis and OrtaloMagné (2008) and others, the elasticity between wages and the price of a good is equal to the
expenditure of a good even for large changes in prices. To see this, let utility take the CobbDoulas form:

. Taking a monotonic transformation the indirect utility
ln

function can be written as:
constant budget share for

, 1

ln

1

is the budget share for

utility constant across areas, ∂ln / ∂ln

is equal to

ln

ln
, and

, where

is the

is a constant. Holding

even for large changes in prices. In other

words, Cobb-Douglas utility suggests that the elasticity between wages and the price of a good is
equal to the good’s budget share even for large price changes. Similarly, Cobb-Doulas utility
predicts that the elasticity between wages and the general price level should equal one. Workers
would, therefore, require full compensation for price differences across cities.
The full compensation hypothesis has considerable intuitive appeal. Suppose there are
two cities with equal bundles of consumer amenities, but one city has higher prices for goods and
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services. If the general price level in the expensive city is 10 percent higher than in the less
expensive city, how much higher will wages have to be in the expensive city to keep workers
from leaving for the other city? Intuition seems to suggest that a worker would need 10 percent
higher wages to compensate for the 10 percent higher price level. In other words, workers would
require full compensation for price differences holding amenities constant.
Workers may not be fully compensated for price differences for a number of reasons. If
workers are highly immobile or do not have sufficiently good information on wages, prices, and
amenities in other cities, then migration may not arbitrage away interarea differences in wages,
prices, and amenities. In other words, barriers to migration may cause workers in some markets
to have higher utility levels than comparable workers in other markets. In reality though,
workers are often quite mobile across markets. Even if some are relatively immobile, the
movement of marginal migrants between labor markets may result in an equilibrium relationship
between wages and prices that yields equal utility across areas for all homogenous workers.
The relationship between wages and prices may also differ from full compensation if
utility is considerably different from Cobb-Douglas and prices are very different across markets.
Thinking of

and

in the above model as housing and non-housing consumption, a high

degree of substitutability between housing and non-housing may cause the true elasticity
between wages and the general price level to be less than one.7 As will be shown later, housing
prices are significantly more dispersed across areas than non-housing prices. If workers can
easily substitute away from housing consumption in places where it is relatively expensive, they
7

Cobb-Douglas utility implies an elasticity of substitution equal to one. The limited literature has not reached a
consensus on the elasticity of substitution between housing and non-housing. Ogaki and Reinhart (1998) estimate
the elasticity of substitution to be 1.17, but not statistically different from one at the 5% significance level. Piazessi,
et al. (2007) find estimates of 0.77 and 1.24 depending on the time period considered, neither of which is statistically
different from one. However, Benhabib, et al. (1991) and McGrattan, et al. (1997) estimate the elasticity of
substitution to be 2.5 and 1.75, respectively. Davis and Ortalo-Magné (2008) do not explicitly estimate the
elasticity of substitution, but do find that the expenditure share on housing is roughly constant over time and across
metropolitan areas suggesting that the elasticity of substitution is close to one.
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will not have to be fully compensated for differences in housing prices.8 As a result, a fixed
basket price index will overstate the true cost of living in expensive cities and cause the elasticity
between wages and the general price level to be less than one.
As hinted above, the wage-price elasticity also depends on the extent to which people
save. If consumption is less than wage income (

), the true wage-price

elasticity should be less than one. Conversely, if consumption is greater than wage income, the
wage-price elasticity may be greater than one. Evidence from the 2005 Consumer Expenditure
Survey suggests that average consumer expenditures are indeed quite close to average after-tax
wage income. The ratio of average expenditures to average after-tax income in the 2005 CES is 0.94.
The CES is a relatively small sample and there could be some misreporting (e.g. of income), but the
available evidence indicates that assuming expenditures are equal to wage income may be a reasonable
first approximation.

There are, therefore, a number of reasons why the elasticity between wages and the
general price level may be less than one. Ultimately, the relationship between wages and prices
is an empirical question. I explore this relationship empirically in subsequent sections.

3. Empirical Considerations/Previous Literature
The theoretical model suggests that under certain conditions, the elasticity between
wages and a composite price index is approximately one. Based on the intuition behind this
result, a number of researchers interested in interarea wage differentials have fully adjusted
nominal earnings using an interarea price index and estimated log wage equations of the form:

8

Consumers can also shift away from consumption of relatively expensive housing toward consumption of local
amenities, especially since local residents can often consume natural amenities at very low marginal cost (e.g.
climate and coastal location). As suggested by an anonymous referee, this appears quite likely along parts of the
California coast, where good weather permits substitution of outdoor living for indoor living.
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ln

(5)
where

/

,

is the wage for person in city ,

personal characteristics,

is the price level in city ,

is a vector of

is the corresponding coefficient vector, and is an error term with

mean equal to zero. Along these lines, Johnson (1983) obtains the seemingly surprising result
that fully adjusted wages are more dispersed across cities than nominal wages, at least for men.9
DuMond et al. (1999), however, argue that full adjustment may be inappropriate. Instead, they
advocate using a partial adjustment where the dependent variable is the log of the nominal wage
and the log of the price index is included as an independent variable on the right hand side:
(6)

ln

ln

.

Doing so, they find wage dispersion to be considerably lower across markets than with either
nominal or fully-adjusted wages.10
Theory and empirics also suggest that wages are affected by attributes that make a city a
more or less pleasant place to live. Therefore, (5) and (6) can also be modified to include cityspecific amenity levels and a corresponding coefficient vector. The parameter
interpreted as the interarea wage-price elasticity. If
if

in (6) can be

= 1, (5) and (6) are equivalent. However,

is not equal to one, (5) may be misspecified. Thus the value of

is of considerable interest.

Roback (1988) estimates equation (6) both with and without amenities and produces
estimates of

equal to 0.97 for both specifications. DuMond et al. (1999), however, estimate a

point estimate for

of 0.46 with amenities and 0.37 without amenities with standard errors small

enough for both to easily reject the hypothesis that

= 1. There are several differences between

the two studies, such as the time period considered, the number of cities considered and the
9

Johnson (1983) uses a pooled cross-section of 34 cities from the May Current Population Survey for 1973-1976
with price data from the BLS for an intermediate standard of living for 1974.
10
DuMond et al. (1999) use a pooled cross-section of 185 cities from the 1985-1995 CPS Outgoing Rotation Group
files with price data from the ACCRA Cost of Living Index from the same period.
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amenities included. However, the most important difference is likely the price indices used and
the way they are used. Roback uses a now discontinued price index produced by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics from the Handbook of Labor Statistics, and DuMond et al. use a price index
based on the ACCRA Cost of Living Index. Measurement error may be more significant in the
ACCRA index, and this may explain some of the difference between the estimates of Roback
(1988) and DuMond et al. (1999). DuMond et al. reestimate their results using the BLS Urban
Family Budget and Comparative Indexes for Selected Urban Areas updated from its 1981 value
(the last year it was produced) using the city-specific CPI for a limited number of cities and find
that the estimate of

without amenities increases to 0.526. This price index is much closer to

the index used by Roback, but the coefficient estimate it yields is still much less than one.
Closer examination of the two studies reveals a more subtle distinction in the way the
price indices are used. DuMond et al. (1999) use the same price index for all workers within a
given city. In Roback (1988), on the other hand, the price variable used consists of “low,
medium, and high standard of living budgets assigned based on individual family income and
number of dependents” (p.41). In other words, Roback assigns persons within a given city a
different budget based on their income. Presumably, her intent is to assign to each individual the
most relevant price for their particular consumption bundle. This approach creates intra-city
variation in prices, and a problem arises if the intra-city variation in prices is spuriously
correlated with intra-city differences in wages. In such a case, the coefficient on the price
variable in the log equation will be biased.
The budgets formerly produced by the BLS and used by Roback (1988) are based on
what it would cost a family of four in a given city to obtain a given standard of living. The BLS
computes the budgets (

) for each standard of living ( ) in each city ( ) by multiplying local

9

prices (

) by a basket of goods (

) for each standard of living. The basket is also allowed to

vary across cities within a standard of living, but is intended to maintain a given standard of
living across cities. Ignoring temporarily that the basket varies across cities, recognize that
. Regressing ln
because

on ln(

) is clearly not the same as regressing ln

is increasing with income. If one were to use the same budget,

on ln
, (e.g. the

intermediate standard of living budget) for all workers within a given city and hence have no
intra-city variation in budgets, then there would be no problem because taking logs causes ln to
drop into the constant term. Using budgets instead of price index values and allowing the
budgets to vary across types of workers within cities means that the “price” variable is severely
confounded by intra-city variations in consumption. In other words, the estimates are biased by
the fact that workers within a city who have higher wages also have higher standards of living
and are assigned a higher consumption basket. In work not shown, I attempt to replicate Roback
(1988). The results suggest that measuring prices by budgets and allowing intra-city variation in
prices does indeed upwardly bias estimates of the wage-price elasticity.11
Henderson (1982) also estimates a variant of equation (6) that includes the log of housing
prices instead of a composite price index. Henderson is also one of the few studies in this area to
look at after-tax earnings instead of pre-tax earnings. He finds point estimates of 0.17 and 0.21
for the coefficient on log housing prices in alternate specifications that vary in the amenities
included. Henderson does not incorporate non-housing prices in his regressions, however, and
he measures housing prices by ownership costs, though rents are likely preferable.

11

Using a single price index for each city, I find that the wage-price elasticity using 1973 data ranges between 0.4
and 0.7 depending on which price index is used. However, this replication of Roback (1988) does not include
amenities and does not account for measurement error in the price index. In subsequent sections of this paper, I
estimate the wage-price elasticity using more recent data controlling for amenities and using instrumental variables
to account for measurement error.
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Recent papers by Albouy (2008b) and Davis and Ortalo-Magné (2008) are also interested
in the relationship between wages and prices. Albouy (2008b) attempts to construct improved
quality of life rankings for cities by among other things incorporating non-housing prices and
federal income taxes into the rankings. His main finding is that improved quality of life
estimates rank large cities more favorably than has been the case using previous methods. He
also computes city fixed effects for log housing prices and log wages and regresses the log
housing prices on log wages and amenities. The regression yields a coefficient of 1.41. Based
on his chosen parameters (for the budget shares of housing and non-housing, etc.), he suggests
that his model quite accurately predicts the relationship between housing prices and wages across
cities. However, he measures housing prices using combined data on housing values and rents.
The results in the current paper suggest that the relationship between wages and rents is
considerably different from the relationship between wages and housing values.
Davis and Ortalo-Magné (2008) develop a model of the equilibrium relationship between
wages and prices across cities that assumes a Cobb-Douglas utility function and therefore that
the expenditure share for housing is constant across cities. They test their model by predicting
city-specific rental values as a function of wages and comparing predicted rents to observed
rents, where quality is held constant for both housing and labor. They find that observed rents
are under-dispersed compared to what is predicted by their model, i.e., rents are too low in many
high wage areas and too high in many low wage areas. Davis and Ortalo-Magné suggest that the
omission of amenities from their analysis may partially explain their results.

11

4. Data and Methods
In the empirical section of this paper, I begin by estimating a variant of equation (6) that
includes amenities ( ):
(7)

ln

ln

.

I use earnings and individual characteristics data from the 2006 Current Population Survey
Outgoing Rotation Group (CPS-ORG) files merged with data on prices and amenities from
several sources.12 My sample consists of all employed wage and salary workers ages 18-61
(inclusive), who are not full-time students. I also exclude all persons with imputed earnings to
avoid imputation bias, which would bias

toward zero (Hirsch and Schumacher, 2004).13 The

dependent variable is the log of the hourly wage (ln

). I use the reported hourly wage for

workers who are paid by the hour and do not receive tips, commissions, or overtime. For all
other workers, the hourly wage is computed by dividing usual weekly earnings by the usual
number of hours worked per week.
My preferred estimates adjust wages for federal income taxes, but I also estimate
equation (7) using pre-tax wages for the sake of comparison. As discussed by Henderson (1982)
and Albouy (2008a,b), the progressivity of the federal income tax system causes workers in high
wage areas to pay a higher percentage of their income in federal income taxes than workers in
relatively low wages areas. The marginal benefit, however, to an individual worker of her
federal income tax contributions is zero because workers consume the same level of federal
public services regardless of their federal tax payments. In other words, while workers pay
higher federal income taxes in high wage areas, they do not receive higher federal benefits.

12

Prices and amenities are measured at the city level, where a city is defined as a Core Based Statistical Area or a
Combined Statistical Area.
13
Imputation bias would likely result because imputed earners are often assigned wages of workers in different
metropolitan areas or even different regions.
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Consequently, when choosing among cities, workers are concerned with the wages they would
earn net of federal taxes in each city instead of gross wages.
The present study does not adjust wages for social security contributions or state income
tax payments. It would be relatively straightforward to estimate social security contributions for
individual workers, but estimating the benefits to workers of their contributions would be more
difficult. I could also estimate state income tax payments for workers, but adjusting wages for
state income taxes is inappropriate unless we also adjust wages for other state and local taxes
because states differ in their reliance on income taxes. Even if we could compute the total
burden of all state and local taxes to each worker, we would still need to account for the benefits
from state and local expenditures that each worker receives. Given the complexities involved
with estimating the net fiscal incidence of social security payments and state taxes, I make no
adjustment for them in the dependent variable.14 Because the dependent variable in this study is
the log of the hourly wage, the analysis is only affected by social security payments and state
taxes to the extent that their net fiscal incidence is not proportional to wages for homogenous
workers in different areas.15 However, to the extent that the total net burden of social security
and state and local taxes and expenditures for homogenous workers is higher (lower) in high
wage areas, regression estimates of

that only account for federal income taxes may overstate

(understate) the true value of .
Federal income tax liabilities are not reported in the CPS-ORG files, but are instead
estimated using the federal tax schedule and based on several assumptions. I assume that all
married couples file jointly and receive two personal exemptions and non-married persons have a
14

Hence, use of the term after-tax wages implies wages net of federal income taxes only.
To illustrate, suppose we have an equal rate tax ( ) on wages ( ) in all areas. Wages net of the tax are (1- ).
Because the dependent variable is in logs, note that ln (1- )) = ln + ln(1- )). Because  is a constant, regression
results will be equivalent (except for the constant term in the regression) regardless of whether the dependent
variable is the log of pre-tax wages (ln ) or the log of after-tax wages (ln (1- ))).
15

13

filing status of single and receive one personal exemption. Itemized deductions are assumed to
equal 20 percent of annual earnings, where annual earnings are equal to usual weekly earnings
times 48.3 (the average number of weeks worked for workers in the March CPS). Taxpayers
take the standard deduction if it is more than their itemized deductions. Deductions and
exemptions are subtracted from annual earnings to estimate taxable income. Tax schedules are
then used to compute federal tax liabilities. I next compute the average tax rate for each taxpayer
(

), and then multiply the hourly wage by one minus the average tax rate to compute after-tax

hourly wages (

1

).

All regressions include a number of individual characteristic variables intended to make
workers roughly similar across cities. The individual characteristics included are eleven dummy
variables for highest level of education received, a quartic specification for experience, and
dummy variables for race/ethnicity (Black, Asian, Hispanic, and other), female, married,
employed part-time, enrolled part-time in school (measured for workers under 25), union
member, naturalized citizen, and non-citizen. Additionally, I include nine occupation dummies,
eleven industry dummies, and three dummies for whether the worker is a federal, state, or local
government employee.16 I also include 11 month-in-sample dummies.
The baseline price index is constructed using the ACCRA Cost of Living Index for 2006.
The ACCRA index is produced quarterly based on prices collected by local chambers of
commerce for a basket of 57 goods and services meant to be representative of actual consumer
expenditures.17 The prices of the 57 goods and services are then weighted (based somewhat on

16

Some individual characteristics are still unobserved. If individuals with high unobserved ability sort into
expensive cities, the estimated wage-price elasticity may be positively biased.
17
While many of the goods in the index might be thought of as traded goods, the law of one price does not strictly
hold because most goods are sold at retail. Retailing in San Francisco is more expensive than retailing in Topeka,
KS because of higher commercial land rents and higher wages needed to compensate for higher housing rents (and

14

CES expenditure data) to form a composite price index and six sub-indices for housing,
groceries, utilities, transportation, healthcare, and miscellaneous goods and services.
The baseline price index based solely on ACCRA data, however, may not accurately
measure intercity variation in prices. One prominent reason is that ACCRA measures housing
prices as a weighted average of the price of two goods: apartment rent and homeowner principal
and interest, with homeowner expenses being given a much greater weight (.82) than apartment
rent (.18). Housing rents measure the price paid per unit of time for the use of housing, and are
therefore the ideal measure of housing prices.18 Homeowner expenses may be an inappropriate
measure of the user cost of housing because they are based on housing values. Homeownership
involves both a consumption decision and an investment decision, and the value of a house is
equal to the expected net present value of the income stream it generates. If expected future
growth in rents differs across cities and over time, then so will the ratios of rents to housing
values. Empirical evidence suggests that this is indeed the case (Clark, 1995; Davis et al., 2008).
Housing values may even be subject to bubbles based on irrational speculation about the growth
in future benefits (Case and Schiller, 2003). Therefore, measuring housing prices using house
values is likely to be inappropriate because house values are not based solely on the present user
cost of housing.19 This may be especially true for recent years given the relatively large increase
in housing values, especially in several metropolitan areas with a relatively inelastic supply of
housing (Glaeser et al., 2008).
subsequently higher non-housing costs). The spread of online shopping is likely to have important effects in
pushing homogenous goods towards a single price, but this is not accounted for under current ACCRA methods.
18
For this reason, the Consumer Price Index produced by the BLS measures housing prices solely by rents.
19
One might consider constructing a price index with housing prices for each metro area measured by user costs of
homeownership net of expected appreciation and then estimate the wage-price elasticity using this index. However,
the benefits of this approach are limited. First, it is unclear how homeowners form expectations about appreciation
and how homeowner user costs should be computed. Second, standard capital theory suggests that in order for the
rental and homeowner housing markets to be in equilibrium, the user cost of rental housing should approximately
equal the user cost of homeowner housing. Therefore, quality-adjusted gross rents may be the best available proxy
for homeowner user costs.
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Additional difficulties arise with the ACCRA index because prices are not reported for all
areas in each year. This has two drawbacks. First, ACCRA often contains no information on
prices for a given city, and hence I must exclude the city from the analysis. This limits my
analysis to 167 cities, though the cities that remain account for 68 percent of workers in the CPS.
A second problem is that prices are reported at the sub-metropolitan level and must be
aggregated to produce city-level averages using population weights, yet not all areas within a
metropolitan area are necessarily included. To the extent that sub-metropolitan areas for which
prices are reported are not representative of areas in the same city for which prices are not
reported, the average price level in the city will be measured with error. Koo et al. (2000)
provide a further discussion of issues associated with using the ACCRA index to measure
interarea price differences.
To address the potential problems that result from using ACCRA data to measure
housing prices, I also compute a modified price index that measures housing prices solely by
rental costs from the 2006 American Community Survey (ACS).20 To do this, I use microdata
available from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) to estimate quality-adjusted
average gross rents for each city in the sample.21 The first step is to regress log gross rents, ,
for each housing unit on a vector of housing characteristics, , and a vector of city-specific fixed
effects, :
(8)

ln

Γ

.

20

The ACCRA Cost of Living Index also reports average rents for an area, but for a number of reasons qualityadjusted rents from the ACS are likely preferable to rents from the ACCRA index.
21
Gross rents include rents as well as basic utilities (water, electricity, and gas) and home heating fuels (wood,
kerosene, oil, coal, etc.). These utilities are often included in rental payments for some renters, but not for others.
Therefore, gross rents are more comparable across households because they include utilities and fuels for all renter
households.
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The housing characteristics included are dummy variables for the number of bedrooms, the total
number of rooms, the age of the structure, the number of units in the building, modern plumbing,
modern kitchen facilities, and lot size for single-family homes. The results from this estimation
are available upon request. I then use the estimated parameters to predict average gross rents for
each city holding the housing characteristics constant at their mean level for the entire sample.22
I then divide the quality-adjusted average gross rents for each city by the mean across cities and
multiply by 100 to create a housing price index based on quality-adjusted gross rents. I then
compute a modified composite price index by taking a weighted average of the rent-based
housing price index and non-housing prices from ACCRA, where housing prices are given a
weight of 0.29 and non-housing prices are a given a weight of 0.71.23 Weights are chosen based
on calculations from the 2005 Consumer Expenditure Survey suggesting that housing (based on
gross rents) represents 29 percent of average consumption expenditures.24
For the sake of comparison, I also compute a modified price index that measures housing
prices by quality-adjusted housing values from the 2006 ACS computed in a manner similar to
quality-adjusted gross rents. For this second modified price index, housing prices are given a
weight of 0.23 because values do not include utilities and non-housing prices (now including
utilities) are given a weight of 0.77.
Summary statistics for several price variables are reported in Table 1. As seen, the
modified price index using gross rents is considerably less dispersed than both the baseline price
22

If, however, there are unobserved aspects of housing quality that are correlated with wages in a city, the estimated
wage-price elasticity may be upwardly biased.
23
For these purposes, non-housing prices are computed as a weighted average of ACCRA sub-indices for groceries
(0.13), transportation (0.25), healthcare (0.06), and miscellaneous goods and services (0.56). Note, that this
excludes utilities in addition to housing because utilities are largely already included in gross rents.
24
Note that this expenditure share for housing differs from official reports of the CES expenditure share for both
“Housing” and “Shelter.” The housing share based on gross rents used herein includes certain utilities but excludes
others and also excludes expenditures for household operations, housekeeping, and household furnishings. The
housing share of 0.29 also differs from the official CES tabulations in that homeowner housing expenditures are
measured by implicit rents and not by out-of-pocket expenses such as mortgage interest.
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index and the modified price index using housing values. Equivalently, housing values are more
dispersed across cities than are gross rents. Non-housing prices are much less dispersed across
cities than both rents and values, but there is still considerable variation in non-housing prices.
Appendix Table A lists the 167 cities included in the sample and their value for the rent-based
price index.
In addition to estimating equation (7), this paper is also interested in the relationship
between wages and the prices of housing and non-housing goods and services. Therefore, I also
divide the price index into housing prices,

, and non-housing prices,

, and include them in

logarithmic form in the log wage equation separately:
(9)

ln

ln

ln

.

Examining housing prices separately from non-housing prices is interesting for several reasons.
For one, it allows us to test if the prediction of equation (4) holds for housing and non-housing
prices separately. Additionally, a large literature in urban and regional economics following
Roback (1982) ranks the quality of life across cities using implicit prices of amenities computed
as the sum of compensating differentials in housing and labor markets,

/

/ . Few

of these studies incorporate non-housing prices (Gabriel et al., 2003; Shapiro, 2006; and Albouy,
2008b are recent exceptions). The justification for this exclusion is often that non-housing prices
are relatively unimportant (Beeson and Eberts, 1989). The non-trivial variation in non-housing
prices illustrated in Table 1 combined with the large budget share for non-housing consumption,
however, suggests that non-housing prices may be quite important. The few papers that do
incorporate non-housing prices often do so in a less than ideal way.25 Separating housing and

25

For example, both Shapiro (2006) and Albouy (2008b) infer non-housing prices from housing prices by regressing
non-housing prices on housing prices using the ACCRA Cost of Living Index. However, their approach ignores
differences in non-housing prices across cities that are not correlated with housing prices. My own analysis suggests
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non-housing prices allows us to examine the importance of each in explaining interarea wage
differentials.
Theory and previous empirical evidence predict that amenities also affect both wages and
local prices. Therefore, my regressions also include a number of different amenities from several
sources found to be important in previous literature.26 A list of variables and data sources is
included in Appendix Table B. Without including amenities, the estimated relationship between
wages and prices could be biased.27 Data for several natural amenities are obtained from the
USDA Economic Research Service. These include the mean January temperature in degrees
Fahrenheit, mean July temperature, mean hours of January sunlight, mean July relative humidity,
the percent of land area covered by water, and five indicator variables for topography that range
from very flat to mountainous. The flattest land surface is the omitted reference group. Mean
annual inches of precipitation and snow are obtained from Cities Ranked and Rated, 2nd Edition.
Maps were consulted to create indicator variables for whether a city is located on the coast of the
Atlantic Ocean, Pacific Ocean or Gulf of Mexico. Data on violent crime and property crime per
capita were obtained from the Census Bureau’s USA Counties website. The mean commuting
time in minutes for workers in a city was computed using the 2006 ACS microdata. Two
measures of air pollution, ozone and particulate matter 2.5, were computed using the EPA
AirData database.28 The regressions also include eight census division dummies and six city

that regressing non-housing prices on division dummies, city size dummies, and amenities in addition to housing
prices does a much better job of predicting non-housing prices than housing prices alone.
26
Many of these are reported at the sub-metropolitan level and had to be aggregated to the CBSA/CSA level using
populations as weights.
27
For example, a pure consumption amenity is likely to drive up housing prices and drive down wages, which would
bias the wage-price elasticity toward zero.
28
Pollution values were unavailable for several small cities and were imputed based on average values by Census
division and city size. Particulate matter was imputed in this manner for 16 cities, and ozone was imputed for 23
cities. I tested the potential effect of this imputation by estimating the regressions without pollution variables and
estimating the regressions with pollution variables but only for cities that had unimputed pollution levels. The main
results of this paper do not appear to be affected by the imputation of pollution values for these small cities.
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population size dummies to account for residual differences in amenities.29 The city size
dummies should also help control for differences in unobserved worker ability across cities.30 No
specification of amenities is likely to fully capture differences in the quality of life across cities,
but the hope is that the variables used in this paper do a reasonably good job of controlling for
differences in the quality of life across cities.

5. Empirical Results: The Elasticity between Wages and the General Price Level
This section presents results of the elasticity between wages and the general price level
using the baseline price index, the price index modified using quality-adjusted gross rents, and
the price index modified using quality-adjusted house values. All regressions include the full list
of amenities, division dummies, city size dummies, and individual characteristics as explanatory
variables. The results for these variables were generally as expected and are available upon
request. I begin by estimating the regressions using Ordinary Least Squares and then proceed to
instrument for prices to account for measurement error, which would bias the estimated
coefficients toward zero. All of the price index coefficients in this section are statistically
different from zero at the 1% level using cluster robust standard errors, but the more appropriate
null hypothesis is whether or not they are different from unity.31
Ordinary Least Squares
I first estimate the wage-price elasticity, , using the baseline price index via OLS. This
specification is comparable to that of DuMond et al. (1999), but my equation contains many

29

The seven city size categories are: 0-199,999; 200,000-299,999; 300,000-499,999; 500,000-999,999; 1,000,0001,999,999; 2,000,000-4,999,999; and 5,000,000+.
30
Glaeser and Maré (2001), Yankow (2006), and Krupka (2008) all find that the nominal city size wage premium
falls after controlling for individual fixed effects using panel data on workers, suggesting that large cities attract
more able workers.
31
Unless otherwise noted, all standard errors in this paper are clustered by city.
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more amenities, more recent data, and uses after-tax wages as the dependent variable.32 As seen
in the first column of Table 2, this specification yields an estimate of

of 0.314, and the

coefficient is statistically different from one at the 1% level. According to this estimate, a one
percent increase in the general price level in a city is associated with a 0.31 percent increase in
after-tax wages. This is also considerably lower than the previous estimate of 0.46 by DuMond
et al. (1999). This may suggest that the sharp increase in housing values in recent years causes
the ACCRA index to be a worse measure of the cost of living in 2006 than it was between 1985
and 1995, the time period considered by DuMond et al. (1999).
The baseline index, however, may do a poor job of measuring differences in prices across
cities in part because it measures housing prices primarily according to house values instead of
rents. Therefore, the rent-based modified price index, which measures housing prices solely by
gross rents from the ACS, may be more appropriate. Using the rent-based price index, OLS
yields an estimated wage-price elasticity of 0.760, much higher than for the baseline price index.
This is an important result. It appears that the wage-price elasticity using the baseline price
index is biased toward zero in part because of how housing prices are measured. However, the
estimate for the rent-based index is still significantly less than one.
I also estimate

using the housing value-based modified price index. Using OLS, the

estimated coefficient is 0.416 and is significantly less than one. Interestingly, the coefficient for
the value-based modified index is greater than that for the baseline index. This suggests that

32

A more subtle difference is that DuMond et al. (1999) include workers with imputed earnings, which likely biases
their estimates toward zero.
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measuring housing prices by values may not be the only source of measurement error in the
baseline index.33
Instrumental Variables
Even after measuring housing prices by quality-adjusted gross rents from the ACS, the
rent-based price index may still be measured with considerable error. Gross rents in the ACS are
likely subject to some degree of sampling error and non-housing prices measured in the ACCRA
Cost of Living Index may be subject to a number of sources of measurement error. Random
measurement error will bias the coefficient on the log of the price index toward zero, and
including variables that are highly correlated with the price index such as amenities, division
dummies, and city size dummies, may exacerbate measurement error bias. I next use
instrumental variables to account for measurement error in the rent-based price index. I use as
instruments lagged values of log gross rents and log non-housing prices. If measurement error is
random, then instrumenting for the price index using the previous year’s components should
produce consistent estimates of . If measurement error in the price index is serially correlated,
however, instrumenting using lagged prices will not produce consistent coefficient estimates.
Table 3 presents 2SLS results for the rent-based modified index. The instruments used
are highly significant in the first stage regressions reported in the lower half of the table. I first
instrument for the log of the rent-based price index using quality-adjusted log gross rents from
the previous year. As reported in the first column of Table 3, instrumenting in this manner yields
a coefficient estimate of 0.994 that is nearly identical to one. Therefore, instrumenting for the
rent-based price index using rents for the previous year provides empirical support for the full

33

It may also be the case that housing values are measured with greater error than rents and this leads to greater
measurement error bias for the value-based modified index than the rent-based index. Bucks and Pence (2006),
however, report that homeowner reported housing values are fairly accurate.
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compensation hypothesis. I next instrument for the rent-based modified index using non-housing
prices for the previous year. The 2SLS coefficient estimate in this case, 0.603, is considerably
lower than that found using OLS. Finally, when we use both gross rents and non-housing prices
as instruments for the rent-based price index, we get a coefficient estimate of 0.830 that is
statistically different from unity at the 10% level.
Non-housing prices are constructed from the ACCRA Cost of Living Index and are likely
subject to considerable measurement error, some of which is likely persistent within cities over
time. If measurement error in non-housing prices is serially correlated, then instrumenting for
the general price level using non-housing prices will not yield consistent estimates of . The
divergence between the estimates in the first and second columns of Table 3 suggests that this is
indeed the case. Quality-adjusted gross rents are estimated from the ACS PUMS and may also
be subject to some measurement error such as due to sampling. However, the measurement error
in log gross rents is much more likely to be classical in nature. If the measurement error in the
lag of log gross rents is purely random and uncorrelated with measurement error in the rentbased price index, then the 2SLS estimates in the first column of Table 3 are consistent. This
seems quite plausible. If log gross rents are a valid instrument, over-identification in the
specification of the third column allows us to examine the validity of non-housing prices as an
instrument. Doing so, we get a Hansen J Statistic of 11.297, which allows us to reject nonhousing prices as a valid instrument at the 1% level. Thus the coefficient in the first column of
Table 3 is the preferred estimate of the elasticity between wages and the general price level.
In results not shown, I also estimate the wage-price elasticity for the baseline index and
the value-based modified price index using 2SLS with lagged price index components as
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instruments. The 2SLS elasticities for the baseline and value-based indices are slightly greater
than the corresponding OLS estimates, but never greater than 0.5.
A recap of the results in this section is warranted. When housing prices are measured by
homeowner values, the estimated elasticity between wages and the general price level is never
more than 0.5, even when I use instrumental variables to account for measurement error. When
housing prices are measured by rents, though, the estimated elasticity between wages and the
general price level increases considerably. Using OLS the estimated wage-price elasticity is
0.76, but instrumenting for the log of the rent-based price index using the log of quality-adjusted
gross rents for the previous year, the wage-price elasticity is equal to one for all practical
purposes. This result supports the full compensation hypothesis and has important implications
for researchers estimating the implicit prices of amenities. In the next section, I examine the
sensitivity of

to alternative specifications.

6. The Elasticity between Wages and the General Price Level for Alternative Specifications
In this section, I briefly examine 2SLS wage-price elasticity estimates using the rentbased price index under some alternative specifications. The results are presented in Table 4. In
all specifications the rent-based price index is instrumented for using my preferred instrument,
the log of quality-adjusted gross rents in 2005. The first row of Table 4 reproduces estimates for
the preferred specification from the first column of Table 3.
Pre-tax Wages
In the second row of Table 4, I estimate

via 2SLS using pre-tax wages as the dependent

variable. As pointed out by Henderson (1982) and Albouy (2008a,b), the progressivity of the
federal income tax causes workers in cities with high nominal wages to pay a higher percentage
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of their income in federal income taxes than workers in cities with lower nominal wages. For the
utility of homogenous workers to be constant across areas, pre-tax wages should be more
dispersed across areas than after-tax wages. In other words, workers in high wage areas must be
compensated for the higher federal income taxes they pay in addition to the compensation they
require for the higher cost of living or worse bundle of amenities. As such, the estimated wageprice elasticity should be higher using pre-tax wages than using after-tax wages. The results in
row 2 suggest that this is indeed the case. The estimate of

increases to 1.062, but is not

statistically different from unity. I maintain, however, that it is after-tax wages that should
equalize across areas controlling for prices, amenities, and individual characteristics, so
measuring wages net of federal income tax provides a better test of the theory than measuring
wages before federal income tax.
State Fixed Effects
If wages should be measured net of federal income tax, we might also consider adjusting
wages for state and local income taxes. Income taxes, however, are only part of the story at the
states and local level. To adjust wages for state and local income taxes, we would also need to
incorporate information on other state and local taxes and state and local public spending. To
avoid the many complexities involved with adjusting wages for state and local taxes and
expenditures, I adopt a different approach by examining the robustness of my results to including
state fixed effects. If ignoring state taxes and expenditures is biasing the previous results, then
we would expect that including state fixed effects would produce a very different estimate of
than the case in which we include census division fixed effects. As seen in row 3, including state
fixed effects reduces the coefficient estimate to 0.949, but it is not statistically different from
one. Therefore, the basic findings of this paper are robust to including state fixed effects. My
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preferred specification, however, is to use census division dummies and not state fixed effects
because several states contain only one city in the sample. Including state fixed effects means
that

is only estimated based on states that have more than one city in the sample.

Renters vs. Homeowners
One might also wonder if using a rent-based price index yields different estimates of
for renters and homeowners. Rows 4 and 5 of Table 4 estimate

separately for renters and

homeowners. The coefficient estimate for renters is 1.037, and the estimate for homeowners is
1.011. Therefore, the coefficient estimates for renters and homeowners separately are slightly
higher than the pooled estimate, but neither estimate is statistically different from unity. The
coefficient estimates for renters and homeowners are also not statistically different from each
other. It appears that differences in prices across cities affect the wages of renters and
homeowners roughly the same.

7. Empirical Results: The Elasticity between Wages and Housing and Non-Housing Prices
I next separate the price index into housing and non-housing prices and include them in
the wage equation separately. The model predicts that under certain conditions the wage-price
elasticity for a good should be approximately equal to the expenditure share for the good. I wish
to explore the validity of this hypothesis for both housing and non-housing prices. Therefore,
based on expenditure shares computed from the 2005 CES, the expected coefficient for housing
is about 0.29 and the expected coefficient for non-housing is roughly 0.71.
I first estimate the log wage equation with log gross rents and log non-housing prices
included simultaneously via OLS. As discussed above, measurement error in prices may bias
coefficients toward zero. Alternatively, if non-housing prices are measured with considerable
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error, while housing prices are measured with relatively little error, the coefficient on housing
prices could be biased upward from picking up some of the effect of non-housing prices. This is
especially problematic given the very high correlation between log gross rents and log nonhousing prices; the raw correlation coefficient between the two is 0.718. The results in column 1
of Table 5 suggest that log gross rents may indeed be picking up some of the effect of log nonhousing prices. The coefficient on log gross rents is 0.337, and is statistically different from zero
at the 1% level but not statistically different from the budget share of 0.29. The coefficient on
log non-housing prices is 0.231, and is statistically different from zero at the 5% level and
statistically different from the budget share of 0.71 at the 1% level.
Ideally, we would like to simultaneously instrument for housing and non-housing prices
to account for measurement error in both. One possibility would be to use lagged values of both
as instruments. However, because measurement error in non-housing prices is likely to be
serially correlated, instrumenting for non-housing prices using its lagged value will not yield
consistent estimates. Instead, I explore estimating the log housing price and log non-housing
price coefficients separately while constraining the other to equal its budget share and
instrumenting using log gross rents for the previous year. This is a hybrid between full
adjustment and partial adjustment for prices used by previous researchers. Constraining one of
the coefficients to be different from its true value, however, will likely bias the other in the
opposite direction. First stage results at the bottom of Table 5 confirm that the log of gross rents
from the previous year is a significant predictor of both log gross rents and log non-housing
prices.
In column 2 of Table 5, wages are fully adjusted for non-housing prices by constraining
the coefficient on log non-housing prices to equal 0.71, i.e., I estimate:
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(10)

ln

.71 ln

ln

.

The coefficient on log gross rents is estimated by 2SLS using log gross rents for the previous
year as an instrument. As seen, the coefficient on log gross rents falls to 0.297 and is not
statistically different from 0.29. In other words, when we fully adjust wages for non-housing
prices, the elasticity between wages and housing prices (measured by gross rents) is nearly
identical to housing’s budget share consistent with the prediction of the model.
In column 3 of Table 5, wages are fully adjusted for housing prices by constraining the
coefficient on log gross rents to equal 0.29:
(11)

ln

.29 ln

ln

.

The coefficient for log non-housing prices is estimated by 2SLS using log gross rents for the
previous year as an instrument. Obviously, if the true value of
estimate for

is greater than 0.29, the

will be upwardly biased. That said, the coefficient on log non-housing prices is

0.754 and is not statistically different from 0.71. The 2SLS results in Table 5, therefore, suggest
that the prediction of the model that the wage-price elasticity for a good is equal to its budget
share holds for housing and non-housing prices separately.
In Table 6, I reestimate the regressions in Table 5 measuring housing prices by qualityadjusted housing values.34 The coefficients on log housing values and log non-housing prices
are always significantly less than their budget shares. In fact, when I fully adjust wages for
housing prices measured by housing values in column 3 of Table 6, the log of the non-housing
price index has a significantly negative coefficient. This reinforces results in the previous
section suggesting that housing values are an inappropriate measure of housing prices.

34

The expected shares for housing and non-housing now change to 0.23 and 0.77 because housing values do not
include utilities and non-housing prices now do.
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8. Implications for Estimating Implicit Prices of Amenities
The empirical results in this paper have important implications for researchers interested
in estimating the implicit prices of amenities or ranking the quality of life across cities. The
relationship between wages and prices is consistent with the full compensation hypothesis when
we measure housing prices by rents and use lagged rents as an instrument for the general price
level. When we measure housing prices by values, however, the relationship between wages and
prices is highly inconsistent with the full compensation hypothesis, even using instrumental
variables. This suggests that using housing values along with wages to infer implicit prices of
amenities is likely to produce biased estimates. To illustrate, I estimate Census division amenity
values by regressing log after-tax wages fully adjusted by both the rent-based modified price
index and the baseline price index on eight Census division dummy variables. These regressions
contain individual worker characteristics but no city level controls other than Census division
indicators. The results are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 7.35 The implicit price of a
division’s amenities is measured as the negative of its division dummy coefficient for fully
adjusted wages. In other words, a low division coefficient indicates a high value of amenities.
If the true wage-price elasticity is equal to one and the rent-based modified index
measures the general price level across cities without systematic error (but potentially random
error), then the estimates of amenity values by division in column 1 are consistently estimated.36
The estimates in column 1 suggest that the Middle Atlantic, Pacific, and New England (the
omitted category) divisions have the most highly valued bundles of amenities. A coefficient of

35

I also regressed the log of the rent-based modified index on log gross rents, amenities, region dummies, and city
size dummies to obtain predicted values that “net out” potential measurement error. Division dummies estimated for
wages fully adjusted using the predicted values of the rent-based modified priced index were nearly identical to
those in column 1 using the actual values.
36
The previous two sections argue that there is systematic measurement error within cities over time in non-housing
prices. This measurement error, however, can still be unsystematic across cities for a given time period.
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0.065 for the West South Central division suggests that a marginal worker will require a 6.5
percent higher “real wage” to live in the West South Central division than in New England to
compensate for the worse bundle of amenities.
Fully adjusting wages using the baseline index, however, may upwardly bias estimates of
amenity values in areas with high values of the index and downwardly bias estimates of amenity
values in areas with low values of the index. This result follows because housing values are
more dispersed than rents across cities, but rents measure the true user cost of housing. The rank
ordering of division dummies in column 2 is similar to that in column 1, but the estimated
coefficients are much larger. According to wages fully adjusted using the baseline index, a
marginal worker will require a more than 20 percent higher “real wage” to live in the West South
Central than in New England. However, because the baseline index measures housing prices
primarily by housing values, the estimated amenity prices in column 2 are biased.
This paper also has implications for researchers who neglect to include non-housing
prices in measuring the implicit price of amenities. Column 3 of Table 7 reports the results of
division dummies for log wages fully adjusted for gross rents (assuming a budget share of 0.29)
but not non-housing prices. The ranking of the coefficients is nearly the opposite of that in
column 1. The West South Central is now the most amenable and the New England and Pacific
divisions are now the worst. These results confirm that ignoring non-housing prices downwardly
biases amenity values for areas with high non-housing prices and upwardly biases amenity prices
for areas with low non-housing prices.37

37

Interestingly, though, the biases from measuring housing prices by housing values and ignoring non-housing
prices are in opposite direction. As a result, measuring housing prices by values and ignoring non-housing prices
produces amenity estimates generally between those in column 2 and column 3.
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9. Conclusion
Differences in wages across areas can be partially explained by differences in prices and
amenities. For a given price level, workers are willing to accept lower wages to live and work in
more amenable locations. Controlling for amenities, wages must be higher in high price areas in
order for workers to achieve equal utility across locations. This paper presents a simple model
that predicts that the elasticity of the wage with respect to the price of a good is proportional to
the share of wage income spent on the good. The model also suggests that if workers’
consumption equals their wage income, then the elasticity between wages and the general price
level should equal one. However, to the extent that the assumptions of the model do not hold,
the actual relationship between wages and prices may differ from that predicted by the model.
Measuring housing prices by rents, I find that the elasticity between wages and the
general price level is nearly identical to one after instrumenting for the general price level using
rents for the previous year. I also present evidence that the wage-price elasticities for housing
and non-housing prices are equal to their budget shares when housing prices are measured by
rents. These results provide empirical support for the full compensation hypothesis.
Importantly, though, when housing prices are measured by housing values, the elasticity
between wages and the general price level is less than 0.5. The findings in this paper have
important implications for estimating the implicit prices of amenities. Measuring housing prices
by values instead of rents will bias estimates and cause cities with high housing values to have
the relative value of their amenities overstated.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Price Indices, 2006
Min.
Max. St. Dev.
Baseline Price Index
84.0
157.9
12.0
Rent-based Modified Price Index
84.1
141.8
9.2
Housing Value-based Modified Price Index
80.3
184.8
15.7
Quality-Adjusted Gross Rents
66.4
184.4
20.0
Quality-Adjusted Housing Values
46.9
395.0
52.9
Non-housing Prices
86.7
124.4
5.7
Notes: Un-weighted mean is normalized to 100. Standard Deviation is unweighted. Includes 167 cities.
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Table 2: OLS Results for Three Price Indices
1
Log Baseline Index

2

0.314c
(0.048)
0.760c
(0.078)

Log Rent-Based Modified Index

Log Value-Based Modified Index
R2

3

0.494

0.495

0.416c
(0.049)
0.494

Notes: Dependent variable is the log of hourly wages net of federal income taxes computed from
the 2006 CPS-ORG files. Standard errors in parentheses are robust, clustered by CSA/CBSA.
Regressions contain observations on 71,705 workers in 167 cities. Regressions also include 8
Census division dummies, 6 city size dummies, January temperature, July temperature, January
sun, July humidity, the % of land area covered by water, 4 indicators for topography, 3 indicators
for coastal location, precipitation, snow, violent crime, property crime, ozone, particulate matter
(2.5), mean commute time, 11 education dummies, a quartic specification for experience,
dummy variables for whether a worker is female, Black, Asian, Hispanic, Other, married,
employed part-time, enrolled part-time in school, a member of a union, a naturalized citizen, or a
non-citizen, 9 occupation dummies, 11 industry dummies, 3 dummies for government
employment, and 11 month in sample dummies. The Baseline Index refers to the price index
constructed solely using ACCRA data. The two modified indices combine housing prices from
the Census with non-housing prices from ACCRA. See text for further details.
c
Significantly different from unity at the 1% level.
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Table 3: 2SLS Results for the Rent-Based Modified Index
1
2
Second-Stage Results
Log Rent-Based Modified Index, 2006
R2

First-Stage Results
Log Gross Rents, 2005

0.994
(0.106)
0.494

Partial R2 of Excluded Instruments

0.603c
(0.108)
0.495

0.830a
(0.091)
0.495

0.878***
(0.077)
0.526

0.290***
(0.017)
0.594***
(0.047)
0.859

0.377***
(0.024)

Log Non-Housing Index, 2005
0.657

3

Notes: Regression in column 1 contains observations on 71,705 workers in 167 cities, while
regressions in columns 2 and 3 contain observations on 69,743 workers in 157 cities. The
dependent variable and additional regressors are the same as in Table 2. Standard errors in
parentheses are robust, clustered by CSA/CBSA.
a
Significantly different from unity at the 10% level. c Significantly different from unity at the
1% level. *** Significantly different from zero at the 1% level in the first-stage regressions.
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Table 4: 2SLS Results for the Rent-Based Modified Index under Alternative Specifications
Coefficient
Standard Error
(1) Preferred Specification
0.994
0.106
(2) Pre-Tax Wages
1.062
0.114
(3) Including State Fixed Effects
0.949
0.110
(4) Renters Only
1.037
0.128
(5) Homeowners Only
1.011
0.122
Notes: Results are from 2SLS regressions for the log of the rent-based price index using log
gross rents for 2005 as an instrument. Regressions contain observations on 71,705 workers in
167 cities. The dependent variable and additional regressors are the same as in Table 2.
Standard errors in parentheses are robust, clustered by CSA/CBSA. None of the coefficients is
statistically different from unity at usual levels of significance.
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Table 5: Separating Housing Prices (Rents) and Non-housing Prices
1
2
OLS
2SLS
Full Adjustment for:
N/A
Non-housing Prices
Log Gross Rents
Log Non-housing Price Index
R2

0.337
(0.038)
0.231c
(0.106)
0.495

First-Stage Results
Log Gross Rents, 2005
Partial R2 of Excluded Instruments

3
2SLS
Housing Prices

0.297
(0.042)

0.483

0.754
(0.289)
0.482

0.934***
(0.032)
0.863

0.138***
(0.029)
0.141

Notes: The dependent variable in column 1 is the log of after-tax hourly wages. In column 2
wages are fully adjusted for non-housing prices, i.e. the coefficient on log non-housing prices is
constrained to equal 0.71. In column 3 wages are fully adjusted for housing prices measured by
gross rents, i.e. the coefficient on log gross rents is constrained to equal 0.29. All regressions
contain observations on 71,705 workers in 167 cities. The additional regressors are the same as
in Table 2. Standard errors in parentheses are robust, clustered by CSA/CBSA.
c
Significantly different from the budget share (0.29 for housing and 0.71 for non-housing) at the
1% level. *** Significantly different from zero at the 1% level in the first-stage regressions.
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Table 6: Separating Housing Prices (Values) and Non-housing Prices
1
2
OLS
2SLS
Full Adjustment for:
NA
Non-housing Prices
Log Housing Values
Log Non-housing Price Index
R2

0.143c
(0.024)
0.165 c
(0.132)
0.494

First-Stage Results
Log Housing Values, 2005
Partial R2 of Excluded Instruments

3
2SLS
Housing Prices

0.091 c
(0.021)

0.482

-0.641 c
(0.226)
0.484

0.992***
(0.024)
0.949

0.097***
(0.015)
0.281

Notes: The dependent variable in column 1 is the log of after-tax hourly wages. In column 2
wages are fully adjusted for non-housing prices, i.e. the coefficient on log non-housing prices is
constrained to equal 0.77. In column 3 wages are fully adjusted for housing prices measured by
housing values, i.e. the coefficient on log housing values is constrained to equal 0.23. All
regressions contain observations on 71,705 workers in 167 cities. The additional regressors are
the same as in Table 2. Standard errors in parentheses are robust, clustered by CSA/CBSA.
c
Significantly different from the budget share (0.23 for housing and 0.77 for non-housing) at the
1% level. *** Significantly different from zero at the 1% level in the first-stage regressions.
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Table 7: Amenity Values by Census Division
Wages Fully Adjusted Using: Rent-based Modified
Price Index
Middle Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific

-0.017
(0.019)
0.075***
(0.018)
0.070***
(0.017)
0.041**
(0.020)
0.059***
(0.017)
0.065***
(0.020)
0.072***
(0.020)
-0.004
(0.022)

Baseline
Price Index

Gross Rents
Only

-0.044
(0.042)
0.128***
(0.019)
0.160***
(0.022)
0.112***
(0.030)
0.132***
(0.022)
0.203***
(0.032)
0.159***
(0.021)
-0.036
(0.041)

-0.020
(0.020)
-0.019
(0.012)
-0.038**
(0.018)
-0.033
(0.020)
-0.045***
(0.014)
-0.054***
(0.016)
-0.018
(0.015)
-0.003
(0.020)

Notes: Regressions contain detailed individual characteristics as in Table 2, but no city-level
variables other than Census division dummies. New England is the reference group. Standard
errors in parentheses are robust, clustered by CSA/CBSA.
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. *** Significantly different from zero at the
1% level.
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Appendix Table A: Rent-based Price Index by City, 2006
City

Index

City

Index

Albany-Schenectady-Amsterdam, NY CSA
Albuquerque, NM CBSA
Amarillo, TX CBSA
Anniston-Oxford, AL CBSA
Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI CSA
Asheville-Brevard, NC CSA
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Gainesville, GA-AL CSA
Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC CBSA
Austin-Round Rock, TX CBSA
Bakersfield, CA CBSA
Bangor, ME CBSA
Baton Rouge-Pierre Part, LA CSA
Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX CBSA
Bellingham, WA CBSA
Bend-Prineville, OR CSA
Birmingham-Hoover-Cullman, AL CSA
Bloomington, IN CBSA
Bloomington-Normal, IL CBSA
Boise City-Nampa, ID CBSA
Boston-Worcester-Manchester, MA-RI-NH CSA
Bowling Green, KY CBSA
Brownsville-Harlingen-Raymondville, TX CSA
Buffalo-Niagara-Cattaraugus, NY CSA
Burlington-South Burlington, VT CBSA
Cape Coral-Fort Myers, FL CBSA
Cedar Rapids, IA CBSA
Champaign-Urbana, IL CBSA
Charleston, WV CBSA
Charleston-North Charleston, SC CBSA
Charlotte-Gastonia-Salisbury, NC-SC CSA
Chattanooga-Cleveland-Athens, TN-GA CSA
Chicago-Naperville-Michigan City, IL-IN-WI CSA
Cincinnati-Middletown-Wilmington, OH-KY-IN CSA
Cleveland-Akron-Elyria, OH CSA
Colorado Springs, CO CBSA
Columbia, MO CBSA
Columbia-Newberry, SC CSA
Columbus-Auburn-Opelika, GA-AL CSA
Columbus-Marion-Chillicothe, OH CSA
Corpus Christi-Kingsville, TX CSA
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX CSA

108.3
101.1
91.9
92.7
99.6
97.1
105.8
94.5
107.0
105.2
100.0
96.8
94.2
104.7
110.2
98.7
98.9
99.1
100.6
123.2
92.2
87.8
100.3
115.9
112.7
94.4
99.4
88.5
103.4
98.2
90.6
112.5
95.6
98.9
102.7
95.4
97.4
98.1
101.1
97.2
104.4

Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL CBSA
Dayton-Springfield-Greenville, OH CSA
Decatur, IL CBSA
Denver-Aurora-Boulder, CO CSA
Des Moines-Newton-Pella, IA CSA
Detroit-Warren-Flint, MI CSA
Dover, DE CBSA
Eau Claire-Menomonie, WI CSA
El Paso, TX CBSA
Erie, PA CBSA
Eugene-Springfield, OR CBSA
Evansville, IN-KY CBSA
Fargo-Wahpeton, ND-MN CSA
Farmington, NM CBSA
Fayetteville, NC CBSA
Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR-MO CBSA
Florence-Muscle Shoals, AL CBSA
Fort Collins-Loveland, CO CBSA
Fort Smith, AR-OK CBSA
Fort Walton Beach-Crestview-Destin, FL CBSA
Fort Wayne-Huntington-Auburn, IN CSA
Fresno-Madera, CA CSA
Gainesville, FL CBSA
Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland, MI CSA
Green Bay, WI CBSA
Greensboro--Winston-Salem, NC CSA
Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson, SC CSA
Gulfport-Biloxi-Pascagoula, MS CSA
Hagerstown-Martinsburg, MD-WV CBSA
Harrisburg-Carlisle-Lebanon, PA CSA
Harrisonburg, VA CBSA
Hartford-West Hartford-Willimantic, CT CSA
Hickory-Lenoir-Morganton, NC CBSA
Houston-Baytown-Huntsville, TX CSA
Huntsville-Decatur, AL CSA
Indianapolis-Anderson-Columbus, IN CSA
Jacksonville, FL CBSA
Jacksonville, NC CBSA
Jackson-Yazoo City, MS CSA
Janesville, WI CBSA
Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol, TN-VA CSA

94.7
96.2
90.8
105.4
95.0
101.6
103.7
92.7
91.9
95.4
105.2
92.0
91.8
94.0
100.8
93.0
87.3
105.6
87.9
104.6
93.3
107.9
101.4
99.1
97.4
94.5
92.8
99.1
94.0
100.7
97.6
112.8
92.8
102.0
94.2
97.9
92.9
103.2
96.4
97.4
86.0
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Johnstown, PA CBSA
Joplin, MO CBSA
Kalamazoo-Portage, MI CBSA
Kansas City-Overland Park, MO-KS CSA
Killeen-Temple-Fort Hood, TX CBSA
Knoxville-Sevierville-La Follette, TN CSA
Lafayette-Acadiana, LA CSA
Lake Charles-Jennings, LA CSA
Lancaster, PA CBSA
Laredo, TX CBSA
Las Cruces, NM CBSA
Las Vegas-Paradise-Pahrump, NV CSA
Lawrence, KS CBSA
Lawton, OK CBSA
Lexington-Fayette--Frankfort--Richmond, KY CSA
Little Rock-North Little Rock-Pine Bluff, AR CSA
Longview-Marshall, TX CSA
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Riverside, CA CSA
Louisville-Elizabethtown-Scottsburg, KY-IN CSA
Lubbock-Levelland, TX CSA
Macon-Warner Robins-Fort Valley, GA CSA
McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX CBSA
Memphis, TN-MS-AR CBSA
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach, FL CBSA
Midland-Odessa, TX CSA
Milwaukee-Racine-Waukesha, WI CSA
Minneapolis-St. Paul-St. Cloud, MN-WI CSA
Mobile-Daphne-Fairhope, AL CSA
Montgomery-Alexander City, AL CSA
Myrtle Beach-Conway-Georgetown, SC CSA
Nashville-Murfreesboro-Columbia, TN CSA
New Orleans-Metairie-Bogalusa, LA CSA
New York-Newark-Bridgeport, NY-NJ-CT-PA CSA
Norwich-New London, CT CBSA
Oklahoma City-Shawnee, OK CSA
Omaha-Council Bluffs-Fremont, NE-IA CSA
Orlando-Deltona-Daytona Beach CSA
Panama City-Lynn Haven, FL CBSA
Pensacola-Ferry Pass-Brent, FL CBSA
Peoria-Canton, IL CSA
Philadelphia-Camden-Vineland, PA-NJ-DE-MD CSA
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ CBSA
Pittsburgh-New Castle, PA CSA

88.6
84.1
95.8
99.3
95.8
88.7
93.2
92.2
105.8
86.4
94.6
109.2
98.4
88.8
92.7
93.0
91.1
128.4
97.5
95.1
94.3
87.1
98.7
118.1
94.1
102.7
107.4
95.4
94.7
97.2
98.9
105.6
132.0
116.1
95.4
95.5
111.0
106.3
100.0
96.1
117.0
106.8
94.3
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Port St. Lucie-Sebastian-Vero Beach, FL CSA
Portland-Lewiston-South Portland, ME CSA
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA CBSA
Prescott, AZ CBSA
Pueblo, CO CBSA
Raleigh-Durham-Cary, NC CSA
Reno-Sparks-Fernley, NV CSA
Richmond, VA CBSA
Roanoke, VA CBSA
Rochester-Batavia-Seneca Falls, NY CSA
Sacramento-Arden-Truckee, CA-NV CSA
Salt Lake City-Ogden-Clearfield, UT CSA
San Antonio, TX CBSA
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA CBSA
San Jose-San Francisco-Oakland, CA CSA
Sarasota-Bradenton-Punta Gorda, FL CSA
Savannah-Hinesville-Fort Stewart, GA CSA
Seattle-Tacoma-Olympia, WA CSA
Shreveport-Bossier City-Minden, LA CSA
Sioux Falls, SD CBSA
South Bend-Elkhart-Mishawaka, IN-MI CSA
Spokane, WA CBSA
Springfield, IL CBSA
Springfield, MO CBSA
St. Louis-St. Charles-Farmington, MO-IL CSA
Stockton, CA CBSA
Syracuse-Auburn, NY CSA
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL CBSA
Toledo-Fremont, OH CSA
Topeka, KS CBSA
Tucson, AZ CBSA
Tulsa-Bartlesville, OK CSA
Tuscaloosa, AL CBSA
Valdosta, GA CBSA
VA Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA CBSA
Waco, TX CBSA
Washington-Baltimore, DC-MD-VA-WV CSA
Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA CBSA
Wausau-Merrill, WI CSA
Wichita-Winfield, KS CSA
York-Hanover-Gettysburg, PA CSA
Youngstown-Warren, OH-PA CSA

108.5
106.2
111.4
106.1
90.6
101.8
111.0
105.1
94.7
105.7
116.1
103.1
97.5
133.8
141.8
110.6
103.0
114.9
92.7
94.3
94.2
102.3
95.3
93.1
97.9
113.5
101.8
106.4
95.3
93.6
103.0
95.0
97.8
92.7
104.4
92.3
121.5
90.9
94.7
94.7
97.9
89.9

Appendix Table B: Variables and Data Sources
Variable
Data Source
Log Wage
Current Population Survey
Worker Characteristics
Current Population Survey
Baseline Price Index
ACCRA
Rent-based Modified Price Index
American Community Survey & ACCRA
Housing Value-based Modified Price Index American Community Survey & ACCRA
Quality-Adjusted Gross Rents
American Community Survey
Quality-Adjusted Housing Values
American Community Survey
Non-housing Prices
ACCRA
Gulf Coast
Consulted Map
Atlantic Coast
Consulted Map
Pacific Coast
Consulted Map
January Temperature
ERS Natural Amenities Scale
July Temperature
ERS Natural Amenities Scale
January Sun
ERS Natural Amenities Scale
July Humidity
ERS Natural Amenities Scale
% Water Area
ERS Natural Amenities Scale
Topography 2
ERS Natural Amenities Scale
Topography 3
ERS Natural Amenities Scale
Topography 4
ERS Natural Amenities Scale
Topography 5
ERS Natural Amenities Scale
Precipitation
Cities Ranked and Rated
Snow
Cities Ranked and Rated
Violent Crime
USA Counties Website
Property Crime
USA Counties Website
Mean Commute Time
American Community Survey
Ozone
EPA AirData Database
Particulate Matter (2.5)
EPA AirData Database
Census Division Indicators
Assigned According to Census Geography
City Size Indicators
Population Estimates from Census Bureau
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